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The Government's costly"? predicament in Seckinger could have been
easily avoided. It could have written a common indemnity clause, as in
Maloof,"8 or it could have appealed the FTCA judgment. The United
States is supposed to be treated as a private party under the FTCA, and
the congressional intent to do so should not be thwarted by misinterpreting
a contract clause to avoid a denial of recovery under state tort law."9 It
is apparent that the United States was given an unfair advantage in the
Court's interpretation, for the Court virtually ignored the most important
principles of contract interpretation in allowing the Government to re-
cover. In his dissent, Justice Stewart was correct when he wrote that
"the meaning attributed to that clause today is as unconscionable as it
is inaccurate.""
Dennis L. Lutes
Right to Jury Trial in a Stockholders' Derivative Action
Stockholders of a closed-end investment company brought a derivative
action in federal district court against the corporate directors and the
corporation's brokers. The stockholders alleged that: (1) the brokers main-
tained excessive control over the board of directors through illegally large
representation, in violation of federal law,' and thus were extracting ex-
cessive brokerage fees; (2) both the directors and the brokers had breached
fiduciary duties;' and (3) the contract between the corporation and the
brokers had been breached. In addition to demanding that the defendants
"'account for and pay to the corporation for their profits and gains and
[the corporation's] losses,"' the plaintiffs demanded a jury trial on the
claims of the corporation. On a motion to strike the demand, the district
court held that the question of jury trial of right was to be decided as if the
corporation itself were the plaintiff, and that only the question of the
shareholders' standing to sue for the corporation had to be tried to the
court." On interlocutory appeal,' the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that a stockholders' derivative action was a single,
equitable cause of action, and that no right to jury trial existed.' Held,
:7 See note 6 supra.
'
6 Maloof v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1965); see notes 49-51 supra, and ac-
companying text.
" See note 38 supra, and accompanying text.
70397 U.S. at 219-20.
'The law allegedly violated was the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1
to 80b-21 (1964).
'Alleged breaches of fiduciary duty consisted of (1) conversion of the corporate assets by
the directors; (2) "gross abuse of trust, gross misconduct, wilful misfeasance, bad faith, [and]
gross negligence" by the directors; and (3) other breaches of fiduciary duty by both the directors
and the brokers. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531-32 (1970).
'Id. at 532.
'Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569, 570-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
528 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
'Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1969).
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reversed: The seventh amendment right to jury trial attaches in a stock-
holders' derivative action to all issues on which the corporation would have
been entitled to jury trial had it been the plaintiff. Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531 (1970).
I. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
The seventh amendment to the Constitution delineates those actions in
which the right to jury trial exists: "In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved . .. ."' Originally, the basic test whether the right to
jury trial existed in a given action was an historical one If in 1791, the
date the seventh amendment was adopted, an action was one which would
have been brought in a court of common law in England, the right to a
trial by jury existed. If, on the other hand, the action was one which in
1791 would have been brought in a court of equity, no right to jury trial
existed.
Such an historical test was completely workable as long as the actions to
which it was applied were those existent in 1791. As new types of actions
were created, however, the simple historical test became insufficient. The
rule used to decide the question of jury right in such cases became one of
analogy-as new causes of action evolved, they were to be compared to the
historical forms, and those to which they were the closest by analogy
would be used as bases for deciding the right to jury trial in their newer
counterparts.'
Such a situation persisted past the time of the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which abolished all procedural distinctions be-
tween law and equity," until 1959. In that year, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover," began a process of
attrition which has cast doubt on the continued vitality of the historical
test and indeed suggests its ultimate replacement by tests more adaptable
to post-Federal Rules procedure."2 A line of cases beginning with Beacon
Theatres, followed by Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood"3 and Simler v. Conner,"
has substantially changed the criteria for allowing jury trial of right in
the federal courts.
In Beacon Theatres the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and an
injunction, and the defendant counterclaimed for treble damages under the
antitrust laws. The decisions of the trial court and the court of appeals
denied jury trial of the defendant's legal counterclaim by deciding the is-
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
' 2B W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5 872 (1961); 5 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.08(5) (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]. On the
various tests for determining jury right, see James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72
YALE L.J. 655 (1963).
95 MOORE S 38.11(7) at 125; James, supra note 8, at 656.
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 2 states that "there shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.,
11359 U.S. 500 (1959).
"See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 92 (2d ed. 1970).
'a369 U.S. 469 (1962).
14372 U.S. 221 (1963).
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sue common to claim and counterclaim without the aid of a jury. The Su-
preme Court, however, held that the trial court was required to allow the
defendant a jury trial on the issue common to the legal and equitable
claims. In Dairy Queen the plaintiff asked for an injunction and an "ac-
counting," which was in fact a demand for a money judgment. The de-
fendant's demand for jury trial was denied by the trial court on the ground
that any legal issues were incidental to equitable ones. The Supreme Court
held that it was improper to refuse the jury trial demand by such charac-
terization of legal issues as "incidental." The complaint in Simler involved
an attorney's contingent fee, was framed as a declaratory judgment action,
and was thus viewed by the lower courts as "equitable." The Supreme
Court held that the complaint presented a common law claim for a money
judgment, and ordered the jury trial demand reinstated.
In general, then, the Court held in each of these three cases that the na-
ture of the issues presented, not the overall characterization of the action,
decides the right to jury trial. Under the Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen-
Simler development, a party cannot be denied the right to jury trial by
trying equitable claims before legal claims involving the same facts, 5 nor
by the court's classification of legal issues as "incidental" to equitable ones."
The nature of the issue is controlling."7
II. JURY TRIAL AND THE STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTION
At common law there was no procedure by which stockholders could
bring suit against the corporation's managers for activities injurious to the
corporation."8 The nineteenth century saw the beginnings of the stock-
holders' derivative action in equitable proceedings which initially allowed
only suits to redress wrongful activities by corporate managers." But equity
soon expanded its protection of stockholders by allowing them to pursue
claims of the corporation against third parties,"' creating a new remedy to
fit an obvious need.
The theory of the stockholders' derivative action soon came to be that
of one action with a "dual nature." The two questions involved in such
suits were: (1) that of the shareholders' right to bring suit for the corpo-
ation, which was purely an equitable question, and (2) that of the corpo-
ration's claims against the managers or third parties, which was either a
legal or equitable question, depending on the nature of the claim." Up to
"5Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
".Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
-l Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
"Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 980,
981 (1957).;
% 9 .The first such suit in the United States was-apparently Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. R.
222 (N.Y.. 1832), which'proceeded on the 'theory that the managers were trustees for the share-
holders.
"Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855)i was the first suit of this type in the
United States. For a general description of the stockholders' derivative action at the present time,
see Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions (pts. I & II), 22 Sw. L.J.
767 (1968), 23 Sw. L.J. 765 (1969).
2Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947); 2 G. HORNSTEIN, COR-
PORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 711 (1959) [hereinafter cited as HORNSTEIN].
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and through the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, how-
ever, the derivative suit's unitary equity origin left no doubt in the minds
of courts or commentators that the entire derivative action was triable to
the court only, and that no right of jury trial attached to any part of it."
Such a situation persisted until 1963, when the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in DePinto v. Provident Security Life Insurance Co.," held
that the seventh amendment right to jury trial attached to all legal issues
in a stockholders' derivative action. The court in DePinto asked itself two
questions: first, whether the equitable origin of the derivative action fore-
closed the question of jury trial; and second, whether the corporate claims
involved were cognizable in a "suit at common law." It answered the first
in the negative and the second in the affirmative. From these answers it
followed that the plaintiffs in DePinto were entitled to jury trial on all
the legal claims of the corporation. The Supreme Court denied certiorari,
and DePinto was allowed to stand alone amidst a smattering of criticism
by commentators and rejection by the other circuits.
III. Ross v. BERNHARD
The Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard chose to follow the policy and
reasoning of DePinto. It prefaced its approbation, however, with a descrip-
tion of the procedural difficulties in a pre-Federal Rules derivative suit,
Fleitmann v. Weisbach Street Lighting Corp.,' which involved a claim of
treble damages under the antitrust laws. The Court stated that Fleitmann
contained "seventh amendment overtones,"' and implied that these "over-
tones" prefigured a time when all stockholders' derivative suits would en-
joy the right of jury trial on all "legal" claims of the corporation on
whose behalf the suit was brought. In fact, though, Fleitmann neither im-
plied nor prefigured any such idea. Rather, it stood for the principle that
derivative suits were not properly brought under statutory schemes that
called specifically for jury trial." While perhaps highlighting the difficulties
inherent in any bifurcated procedural system, Fleitmann is really irrelevant
to the question of the right to jury trial in properly-brought derivative
actions."8
2 Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); 13 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 5931, 5944 (1970); HORNSTEIN § 730; N. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS ch. 8, 5
3 (1959); 5 MOORE § 38.38, at 307. Professor Lattin is the most explicit on the point:
A derivative action is an invention of courts of equity and may be brought only
in equity whether the corporate cause of action be in law or not. As far as cor-
porate rights and defenses available against it are in issue, these issues are decided
exactly as if the corporation were the plaintiff except the matter of jury trial, for
the case being in equity there is no right to jury trial.
N. LATTIN, supra, § 3, at 350. Hornstein is more laconic: "The judge, without a jury, tries the
case onthe :merits." HORNSTEIN: 730, at 245.
-2323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir." 1963),. cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964).
24 See,'e.g., Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in a Stockholder's Derivative Action, 74 YALE
LJ. 725 (1965). The Second Circuit specifically disagreed with DePinto in Ross v. Bernhard,
403. F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1969).
25 2 4 0 U.S. 27 (1916).
26 396 U.S. at 536.
2240 U.S. at 28.
" The specific problem of cases such as Fleitmann has been solved by the Second Circuit in
Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953), in which the
19701 NOTES
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The balance of the opinion was an affirmation of DePinto. Taking as its
starting point the Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen cases, the Court re-
viewed the DePinto rationale and found it correct in every aspect. The
crux of the theory of Ross is found in a single sentence: "Purely procedur-
al impediments to the presentation of any issue by any party, based on the
difference between law and equity, were destroyed [by the adoption of the
Federal Rules]."" The Court reasoned that the pre-Federal Rules refusal
to split derivative suits in to equitable and legal parts, with consequent
court and jury trials respectively, was based on a system of remedies in
which courts of law would simply not allow derivative suits, and courts
of equity, after obtaining jurisdiction, would try all the corporate issues
after determining the plaintiff's right to sue on the corporate claim. Ac-
cording to the Court, the only stumbling blocks to allowing jury trial in
such cases were "purely procedural impediments" caused by the law-equity
split."' The Court pointed out that if the law courts had taken from equity,
as they had so many other things, the idea that stockholders' derivative
suits were a proper remedy under their system, the corporate claims would
doubtless have been tried to a jury. It then reasoned that despite the ab-
sence of such borrowing, the adoption of the Federal Rules had had pre-
cisely the same effect. The nature of the issue presented, whether legal or
equitable, was to be the sole criterion for deciding the right to jury trial.
The manner in which the parties were granted access to the court was to be
no bar to the presentation of legal issues to a jury."
There are difficulties inherent in each step of this reasoning, several of
which were noted by the dissent. First, the Court's postulating the "dual
nature" of the derivative suit, distinguishing the stockholder's right to sue
from the merits of the corporate claims, is arguably of little probative
force. For the dual nature concept is essentially an attempt to point out
that the plaintiff and his corporation are separate legal persons, and that
the derivative plaintiff is bringing what would have been a claim of the
corporation. The concept thus describes the nature of the derivative action
-one brought to sustain a right contained in the more "direct" right of
another. It does not describe two actual substantive phases of the deriva-
tive action. 2 This is where the Court's reliance on the dual nature con-
cept fails. All the substantive rights brought in the derivative action are
court approved the bringing of a derivative suit under the antitrust laws, the same type of action
unsuccessfully brought by the plaintiff in Fleitmann. The resolution of this problem is only in-
cidentally related to the question in Ross, however, since the action approved in Fanchon is a new
post-Federal Rules breed of derivative action, and not the historical derivative action represented
by Ross. Fanchon involves a new remedy, one not envisioned before the adoption of the Federal
Rules, and only post-Federal Rules developments apply to it.
'9396 U.S. at 539-40.
asThe Court did note that jury trial by right of the corporate claims would have been possi-
ble, prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, under Equity Rule 23, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch.
359, 5 4, 24 Stat. 506, and the Law and Equity Act of 1915, ch. 90, §§ 274a-74c, 38 Stat. 956.
This admission does substantial damage to the rationale of Ross, for if the right of jury trial
could have been exercised under the earlier procedural system, clearly it was not "purely pro-
cedural impediments" which caused the conspicuous absence of jury trial by right in pre-DePinto
derivative actions. This was pointed out by the dissenting opinion in Ross.
"'The Court concluded that at least some of the corporate claims in Ross were legal, re-
quiring jury trial. 396 U.S. at 542.
3 See note 22 supra, and authorities cited therein.
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those of the plaintiff-shareholder: first, the right to bring the action on
behalf of his recalcitrant corporation, and second, the right to obtain a
judgment on what the dual nature concept describes as the corporate
claims, in order to protect his own right as part owner of the corporation.
"Dual nature" is thus a misnomer when used to describe the substantive
makeup of a derivative action. The concept describes the several com-
ponents of the action-the plaintiff's shareholding and the wrongs done the
corporation. But, in ignoring the translation of these components into a
substantive claim, the concept overlooks the substantive basis for describ-
ing the entire derivative action as unitary and equitable-the fact that all
the components of the action are sustained by one plaintiff holding a
derivative right to the total redress demand. The Ross Court's dual nature
analysis succeeds in combating the theory that the derivative action is a
single equitable action by arguing in terms of something other than the
derivative action. The Court instead envisions some sort of action in which
the "corporate claims" are viewed in theoretical isolation, removed from
their context of enforcement by a separate legal entity, the plaintiff -stock-
holder. The Court's analysis thus says that for purposes of determining the
right to a jury trial, the derivative action will be deemed to be not what it
really is, a suit brought by the stockholder, but rather a suit brought by
the corporation. The game is declared won by momentarily suspending the
rules.
Second, the Enabling Act expressly precludes the Federal Rules from
abridging, modifying, or enlarging the substantive rights of any party." It
should follow that if the right to jury trial did not exist in derivative
actions prior to the Federal Rules, the adoption of the Rules should have
had no effect on the right to jury trial in such actions. The reply to this
contention is that the right to jury trial always existed in the "legal" phases
of derivative actions, but was blocked by procedural impediments until
the passage of the Federal Rules. No matter how it is rationalized, how-
ever, the fact remains that whereas the right to jury trial was not allowed
in pre-Federal Rules derivative actions, now, after Ross, it is. This fact
would seem to indicate an enlarging of the substantive rights of parties
by the Federal Rules--a clear violation of the Enabling Act.
The ultimate source of the Ross rationale was the Court's interpretation
of Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, and the supposed attrition worked
by these cases on the scope of equity jurisdiction. The Court was correct
in observing that this line of cases had affected the scope of equity. But in
failing to supersede Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen by declaring equity's
existence a thing of the past, the Court lost an excellent chance to clarify
the entire question of the seventh amendment's post-Federal Rules scope.
The dissent's view of these cases is the proper one as long as equity exists
at all: the decisions in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen mean that where
legal and equitable causes of action, historically brought as separate actions
in separate courts, are mixed under the merged system of procedure, the
3328 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). The Ross dissent found this prohibition, in combination with
history, conclusive of the issue in Ross. 396 U.S. at 544.
